We incorporate normative motivations into the standard, unilateral precaution model of tort. Individuals have moral concerns about causing harm and would like others to believe that they have such concerns. In the absence of legal liability, the occurrence of harm suggests low concerns and is therefore damaging to one's reputation, which feeds back into incentives to take precautions. These nevertheless remain suboptimal if informal motivations are not strong enough for injurers to willingly compensate victims ex post. By contrast, perfectly enforced legal liability crowds out informal motivations completely (e.g., tortfeasors su¤er no disesteem) but precautions are then e¢ cient. Under imperfect enforcement, informal motivations and legal sanctions complement one another. With strict liability, individuals held liable su¤er disesteem, there is motivational crowding-out but no net crowding-out with respect to overall incentives. Under the negligence rule, there is motivational crowding-in when image concerns induce bunching on the legal due care standard.
Introduction
The risk of lawsuits induces precautions to prevent accidental harm to third parties. In the economic model of legal liability, incentives to exercise care reduce to the 'implicit prices'set by tort rules. 1 Casual observation suggests that other motivations are often also at work. Most people exercise some care out of intrinsic concerns about hurting others or because they fear social disapproval if they are thought not to mind. In this paper, we augment the standard, unilateral model of tort to include such concerns.
We consider the role of a moral prescription that seems particularly relevant in a tort context. Kaplow and Shavell (2002) remark that there is a strong norm to avoid harming others and to compensate for the harm that one does cause. The prescription is a variant of the immemorial 'golden rule', i.e., "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". We take this prescription as given. Individuals are assumed to feel guilt or bad conscience when they do not abide by it. This provides an internalized source of motivation to prevent damaging events. However, some individuals are intrinsically more motivated than others. Moreover, individuals have a preference for social approval. They care about the esteem earned if they are believed to have good predispositions and the disesteem if not. The moral norm is therefore also a social one in the sense that, in addition to intrinsic motivation, compliance is enforced by approval or reproach from others.
The issue is how such 'normative motivations'interact with formal legal sanctions to in ‡uence behavior. It is often formulated in terms of whether law and informal incentives are substitutes or complements. 2 The behavioral economics literature has much emphasized the possibility that pecuniary incentives may undermine informal motivations; e.g., the much quoted study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) on the crowding-out e¤ect of …nes and the survey by Frey and Jegen (2001) . If crowding-out e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, legal liability in the tort context could well be counterproductive and reduce precautions to prevent accidental harm. Conversely, it could be that informal motivations and legal sanctions combine to generate too much incentives. For instance, Cooter and Porat (2001) ask whether courts should deduct 'nonlegal sanctions'from legal damages to avoid overdeterrence.
We …rst consider two benchmarks: no-liability versus perfectly enforced legal liability (both strict liability and the negligence rule). In the absence of legal liability, injurers take precautions, if at all, solely out of moral or image concerns. In fact, when such concerns are su¢ ciently strong, injurers could go so far as to willingly compensate their victims ex post, thereby imposing upon themselves the same penalties as under the strict liability legal regime. Anticipating this, they would therefore choose ex ante to exert e¢ -cient care. To allow a role for legal liability, we introduce an upper bound on the extent to which preferences di¤er from the standard model. This precludes spontaneous compensation ex post. Under no-liability, individuals are then shown to take suboptimal precautions but nevertheless to exert some care to avoid causing harm. By contrast, perfectly enforced legal liability crowds out informal incentives completely, e.g., tortfeasors incur no social disapproval. However, precautions are then socially e¢ cient, as in the standard model. There is no overdeterrence: when legal liability is introduced, informal incentives either disappear or lose their bite.
Next we examine imperfectly enforced legal liability, e.g., victims do not always bring suit because they have insu¢ cient evidence to prevail in court.
We show that normative motivations and formal legal sanctions then complement one another, e.g., an individual held liable faces both legal damages and disesteem. Thus, informal and formal incentives interact to induce more precautions than under no-liability. Under the strict liability regime, there is some crowding-out of informal incentives but no net crowding-out with respect to overall incentives. Under the negligence rule, there may be motivational crowding-in. Because of the signal sent by a negligence ruling, image concerns tend to induce bunching on the legal due care standard. Thus, when enforcement is imperfect, the negligence rule may do much better than strict liability because of the individuals'concern for social approval. We complete the analysis with a welfare comparison of the di¤erent legal regimes -noliability, strict liability, and the negligence rule. In particular, we discuss the extent to which the legal rules are consistent with the underlying moral norm. We also discuss causation requirements under the negligence rule and how the analysis can be extended to the bilateral precaution framework.
We share with a strand of literature the idea that an individual's actions may signal something about his unobservable predispositions and that some predispositions are more socially esteemed than others. In Bernheim (1994) , individuals seek to signal that they do not have extreme predispositions, hence the possibility of an endogenous conformity norm. In Bénabou and
Tirole (2006) and Daughety and Reinganum (2010, they seek to signal that they have good pro-social characteristics by contributing to a public good. This leads them to contribute more than if their actions were unobservable.
In our analysis, predispositions refer to one's 'moral type', by which we mean an individual's sensitivity to the prescription not to cause uncompensated harm. By contrast with the above literature, however, an individual's actions (i.e., precautions to avoid accidental harm) are not directly observable by the public at large. They a¤ect public perception about one's predispositions only through what can be inferred from the occurrence of damaging events or from court rulings (i.e., liable for damages versus not liable). Section 2 presents the basic setup.
In section 3, we analyze no-liability and perfectly enforced liability; in section 4, imperfectly enforced liability.
Section 5 discusses the results from a utilitarian point of view. Section 6
concludes.
The model
Our starting point is the unilateral accident framework of the law and economics literature. Some individuals, hereafter injurers, can engage in an activity that may harm third parties. In the standard model, injurers care only about their private costs and bene…ts as conventionally de…ned. We brie ‡y review the role of tort rules in this context. 3 Next we introduce normative motivations.
The standard model. The risk generating activity provides the private bene…t b; with probability p it imposes on others the loss L. Both b and L are pecuniary or are monetary equivalents; agents are risk neutral. The probability of accident depends on the injurer's precautions. A smaller p means more precautions; the cost is c(p) with c 0 < 0 and c 00 > 0. At the boundaries, c(1) = c 0 (1) = 0 and c 0 (0) = 1. Totally eliminating the risk of harm is prohibitively costly but the marginal precaution cost is nil at the no-precaution level.
Absent legal liability, the payo¤ from the activity is y = b c(p); not engaging in the activity yields a payo¤ normalized to zero. All potential injurers therefore engage and exert no care to avoid harm. Given the loss su¤ered by victims, social welfare is W b c(p) pL. The socially e¢ cient precaution level p minimizes c(p) + pL, the sum of precaution and expected accident costs. It is socially e¢ cient for potential injurers to engage in the risk generating activity if b c(p ) p L > 0. We assume this condition holds, i.e., the gross bene…t b is taken to be su¢ ciently large.
For future use, let P (t) be the level of care minimizing c(p) + tp; where t 0 is some given parameter. The function P (t) is strictly decreasing, with
The tort rules are strict liability and negligence. Under strict liability, injurers are liable for full compensatory damages irrespective of the precautions they have taken. The victim then only needs to prove causation. Litigation costs are assumed to be negligible. An injurer's expected payo¤ is therefore y b c(p) pL, which induces e¢ cient precautions. Under the negligence regime, victims need to prove the injurer's carelessness, i.e., that precautions did not meet the legal due care standard. 4 Due care is assumed to be set at the socially e¢ cient level, meaning that negligence is found when the in-3 See Shavell (2007) for a recent survey. In Shavell's terminology, injurers and victims are "strangers to one another", which rules out contractual agreements to prevent or mitigate harm. 4 Fault or negligence is the usual basis of liability.
jurer's precautionary behavior entailed p > p . The expected payo¤ from the activity is then
This is maximized by complying with due care. Thus, under either liability rule, injurers exert the …rst-best level of care. Moreover, their decision to engage in the risk generating activity is socially warranted, even though under the negligence rule injurers do not bear the full cost.
We also need to consider situations where legal liability is only imperfectly enforced. Victims sometimes do not …le suit because they cannot prove causation or negligence. Let q denote the probability that a victim has access to su¢ cient evidence. Under strict liability an injurer's expected payo¤ is now y b c(p) pqL. The induced care level is then p = P (qL) and is suboptimal when q < 1. Under the negligence rule, the expected payo¤ is
Because of the discontinuity in the payo¤ function, e¢ cient precautions may be induced provided the probability of enforcement is su¢ ciently large. Let
When the probability of enforcement is q N , the injurer is just indi¤erent between complying and not complying with due care. Clearly, q N < 1 and injurers prefer complying with due care whenever q > q N . When q < q N , they do not to comply and behave as under strict liability, i.e., p = P (qL).
Moral and image concerns. We now depart from the standard model by introducing normative motivations. The moral prescription is that harming others should be avoided; if one nevertheless causes harm, one should compensate the victim. To some extent, this prescription is internalized through intrinsic 'moral concerns'. Individuals su¤er disutility (e.g., guilt or bad conscience) when they do not conform. Individuals also care about social esteem and would like others to believe that they have high moral concerns. Both moral and esteem concerns constitute normative motivations in the sense that they derive from one's allegiance to the moral prescription or one's attempt to signal allegiance.
The utility function is now U (y; x; e) = y x + e;
where y is net material payo¤, x is the harm that one causes, and e is social esteem; and are positive parameters. For simplicity, all injurers are assumed to care equally about social esteem, i.e., they have the same parameter . However, they di¤er in the extent of their moral concerns. An individual's is private information and denotes his 'moral type', by which we mean his sensitivity to the moral prescription. The distribution of types is common knowledge and is described by the density f ( ) with support
and average value . Social esteem depends positively on society's perception of one's moral type. We write e = b where b denotes the beliefs about the individual's type. 5 No spontaneous compensation. In the standard model, and are both zero and utility reduces to the net material payo¤ y. When the parameters are positive, however, there will be situations where all injurers exert e¢ cient care even without legal liability. This occurs when those who cause harm willingly compensate their victim. In the standard model there is nothing to prevent injurers from doing so, but the issue is not raised because injurers would never willingly compensate. We will introduce parameter restrictions ruling out this type of behavior in the present set-up as well. As a result, b 1 = and the action of compensating reveals nothing about one's moral type. 6 Ex ante, injurers anticipate that they will compensate. Therefore they choose the precaution level that maximizes b c(p) pL + , yielding the e¢ cient p .
The same outcome arises even if the upper bound of moral types satis…es h < 1 provided the esteem concern parameter is su¢ ciently large. Now injurers will not compensate on purely moral grounds because the 'bad feelings'from not complying with the moral prescription is less painful to them than the money cost of compensating. However, injurers care a lot about the disesteem they would su¤er by signalling their disregard for the prescriptive rule. 7 Again, the action of compensating will be anticipated ex ante so that all injurers will exert the e¢ cient precaution level. As in the previous example, formal legal liability would serve no purpose. The following parameter restriction rules out spontaneous compensation.
The condition de…nes an upper bound on the extent to which preferences depart from the standard model. Injurers put some weight on complying with the moral prescription (some put zero or negligible weight), but they all put greater weight on their own material payo¤, i.e., < 1 for all types. Moreover, their moral concerns and their desire for social esteem cannot simultaneously be too large. 6 The action of not compensating is out-of-equilibrium. Any belief b 0 2 [ l ; ] supports the equilibrium. 7 When compensation is paid, the reputational utility is . When no compensation is paid (an out-of-equilibrium action), it is b 0 , say with b 0 = l . Hence, compensation is the preferred action when is su¢ ciently large.
Let U 0 and U 1 be de…ned as above. A type-injurer chooses not to compensate his victim if U 1 < U 0 , that is if
Beliefs about one's type belong to the interval (5) always holds. Thus, we have:
Lemma 1 At equilibrium, injurers do not voluntarily compensate their victims.
Although our injurers di¤er from standard homo economicus, they behave the same way following the occurrence of harm. By contrast, if they were to voluntarily compensate their victims, they would impose upon themselves the same penalties as under the strict liability legal regime. 8 Posterior information. Throughout the paper, with a quali…cation in the case of negligence based liability, an injurer's precautions are assumed to be private information. Precautions can a¤ect esteem only indirectly through the occurrence or non occurrence of harm. This is in line with the view that tort law is an ex post harm-based mechanism for deterring undesirable behavior, by contrast with an ex ante act-based approach as with safety regulations. 9 When the tort regime is negligence, we will suppose that some evidence about the injurer's precautions becomes available to the court and that the evidence is su¢ ciently informative to assess whether the injurer complied with due care. However, the general public is assumed to be informed only of the court's ruling, not of the detailed evidence disclosed at trial. Social esteem depends on information available at large in the general public. In our basic scenario, ex post public information about an injurer will take the form of a binary signal with the random outcome B or G. The notation is B for 'bad news'(i.e., unfavorable information) and G for 'good news'. The interpretation of these events depends on the context. For instance, B may be "injurer caused harm" or "injurer caused harm and was found negligent (hence is held legally liable under a negligence rule)". Observe that the ex post information about an injurer's predisposition would not reduce to events such as B or G if, at equilibrium, injurers attempted to signal their type by voluntarily compensating victims. From lemma 1 nothing can be inferred from the fact that a particular injurer did not o¤er compensation.
The probability of the random events depends on the injurer's precautions; we denote with '(p) the probability of B. Inferences about an injurer's predisposition depend on whether B or G occurred. Denoting society's posterior beliefs about one's type by b B and b G , a general formulation for the expected utility of a type-injurer is then 
Beliefs satisfy Bayesian up-dating when the conditioning events have positive probability over the population of injurers. When a conditioning event has zero probability, the posterior belief is to some extent arbitrary. In some settings, bad news will never occur at equilibrium. This will arise when all injurers conform to a standard of behavior precluding bad news. In that case, b G = and the equilibrium will be 'supported' by a range of out-ofequilibrium beliefs b B . It will often be convenient to think of these beliefs as b B = 0. The reason is that the worst moral type will then be the one with the greatest incentive to deviate to an action generating a positive probability of bad news.
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Of particular interest is b G b B , the gap in social esteem between good and bad news, which we will refer to as the reputational penalty. When both B and G have positive probability, (7) and (8) can be combined to yield
The integral in the numerator is the covariance between and '(b p( )), a negative quantity when '(b p( )) is decreasing in . Esteem concerns will provide incentives through the reputational penalty attached to bad news.
No-Liability vs Perfectly Enforced Liability
While injurers are not willing to compensate their victims ex post, they will want to take some precautions to prevent the occurrence of harm. We consider two benchmarks. The …rst is the case where harm is not subject to legal liability. Incentives to take precautions then rely solely on moral and esteem concerns. Next, we introduce perfectly enforced legal liability and examine how this combines with normative motivations.
No-liability. Causing harm often does not trigger legal liability. It may be that the harm is not subject to judicial sanction because it is trivial or considered part of the usual risks of life. Even when legal liability applies in principle, victims often do not …le suit because judicial procedures are too expensive compared to the stakes.
Let k denote the probability that the injurers' involvement in causing harm becomes publicly known. Consider …rst the no-publicity case where an individual causing harm is never detected (e.g., damages to one's car in a parking lot). A type injurer then chooses his precaution level p to maximize
Because no information about the injurer is made public, his perceived type is the prior mean. Using the function de…ned in the previous section, the type-injurer chooses p = P ( L). Given Assumption 1, this is greater than the e¢ cient p but less than unity, i.e., some precautions are taken out of moral concerns. More morally concerned individuals exert greater care.
Suppose now that k is positive. Denote by B the event "an occurrence of harm is ascribed to the injurer". In other words, an accident has occurred and the injurer's involvement is common knowledge. In terms of the notation of the previous section, event B has probability '(p) = pk. The event G is "no occurrence of harm is ascribed to the injurer", meaning that there is no information concerning the injurer's involvement in an accident. This event has probability
Either harm has not occurred or it has occurred but has not been observed by society at large or has been observed but not causally related to the particular injurer (i.e., the injurer is not detected).
The expected utility of a type-injurer is now
This can be rewritten as
In equilibrium, as shown below, society's beliefs will satisfy b B < < b G .
Event B in ‡icts disesteem while event G provides esteem. Given the reputational penalty, the best-response function of a type-individual is
where the subscript stands for 'zero liability'. Compared to no-publicity, esteem concerns now provide incentives. Next we look for the equilibrium reputational penalty. It is obtained by substituting the injurers'best response functions (12) in lieu of b p( ) in the right-hand side of (9) and solving the resulting equation for . Recalling
where p 0 ( ) is the average best response over all types. Less morally concerned individuals exert less care and therefore are more often involved in causing accidents. Hence, a below average moral type is inferred from the occurrence of harm. The condition 0 ( ) < 1 characterizes a stable equilibrium; see …gure 1. We discard unstable equilibria should they exist (as with point Q in the …gure). There remains the possibility that there is more than one stable equilibrium (say E 1 and E 2 in the …gure). While this raises interesting issues, it is not our main concern. In what follows, we loosely refer to "the" equilibrium; should there be multiple equilibria, we focus on the one with the largest reputational penalty.
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Proposition 1 Under no-liability, individuals known to have caused harm su¤er disesteem, normative motivations mitigate carelessness but injurers exert sub-optimal care. They exert greater care the greater the publicity about involvement in causing harm.
The equilibrium reputational penalty depends on the detection probability and can be written as (k). The proposition therefore states that k (k)
is increasing in k. Nevertheless, moral and esteem concerns are never strong enough to induce e¢ cient care, even when causing harm is always detected.
Note that a greater probability of detection need not increase the reputational penalty itself. The e¤ect of publicity depends on whether precautions are strategic substitutes or complements. They are strategic substitutes when 0 is negative (as at E 1 in …gure 1). This arises when accidents occur often and injurers are detected with su¢ ciently high probability. A greater probability of detection then means that bad news become even more banal. This reduces the reputational penalty, which is not to say that incentives to exert care are reduced. e¤ects may decrease as more crime are detected, so that deterrence is reduced (see also Rasmusen 1996) . In our case, the e¤ect of greater publicity on the reputational penalty can go either way because it depends on the inferences drawn at equilibrium; however, it cannot reduce it to the point that better detection would yield less deterrence.
Perfectly enforced legal rules. Perfect enforcement corresponds to the elementary version of the economic model of torts. Suppose that, following the occurrence of harm, victims always have access to perfect evidence and can therefore always prove causation. This su¢ ces under strict liability. Under the negligence rule, victims receive evidence showing whether the defendant was negligent or not. A lawsuit imposes a small cost on plainti¤s, so that they sue only if they have a valid claim, but litigation costs are otherwise negligible. Suppose also that out-of-court settlements are infeasible, so that all suits go to trial. Finally, suppose that trial outcomes are the only information that becomes available to the general public. We derive the implications of these assumptions and then show that some can be relaxed.
Under strict liability, victims always sue. Injurers therefore know that, should they cause harm, they will have to pay compensatory damages and that their involvement in causing harm will be public information. The bad news event B is "injurer was found liable". This has probability p.
The complementary event G is "injurer was not sued, hence did not cause harm". Injurers are forced to compensate their victim. Albeit unwillingly, they therefore comply with the underlying moral prescription. As a result, they su¤er no moral disutility but bear the victims' losses. The expected utility of a type-injurer is then
Expected utility does not depend on the injurers' type and best responses are therefore type independent. It follows that the events G and B provide no information about type, i.e., at equilibrium b B = b G = . All injurers choose the e¢ cient precaution level p and there is no reputational penalty from causing harm.
Under the negligence rule, injurers who comply with due care are never sued. Those who do not comply and cause harm are found negligent and this becomes public information. Thus, the bad news event B is "injurer was found negligent". Event G is the complementary event "injurer has not been sued", which means that either the injurer was not involved in causing harm or that he caused harm but complied with due care, hence was not sued. A type-injurer now has the expected utility
The upper branch is the expected utility when the precaution level satis…es due care. With probability one, the injurer's perceived type will then be b G . With probability p, the injurer will nevertheless cause uncompensated harm, which yields moral disutility. The lower branch is for an injurer who does not comply with due care. With probability 1 p, harm will not occur and the belief will again be b G . With probability p, the injurer will be sued and will pay damages. He then su¤ers no moral disutility from having caused harm but his perceived type is b B .
Consider …rst the injurer's best precaution level consistent with meeting the due care standard. Because c(p) + pL is strictly convex and is minimized at p , dU dp
Thus, precautions will never exceed due care. For precaution levels that do not satisfy due care, and supposing that b B b G , dU dp
Combining both results (and noting that complying with due care does strictly better than barely complying), the utility maximizing precaution level is p . Because all injurers exercise due care, b G = and b B is an outof-equilibrium belief. From the above argument, any b B supports the equilibrium.
Our assumptions about the litigation subgame can be modi…ed in many respects without a¤ecting the outcome. For instance, it would not matter if out-of-court settlements were allowed and their content remained secret. Victims would obtain the same damages at they would at trial, which is all that matters. The outcome would also remain the same if involvement in causing harm is assumed to be publicly observable independently of court rulings or lawsuits. Under strict liability, causing harm and being held liable However, there is no net crowding out e¤ect because all injurers exert greater care than in the absence of formal sanctions.
Imperfectly Enforced Legal Rules
We now assume that victims have access to perfect evidence only with probability q. Speci…cally, a victim knows for sure whether he has su¢ cient evidence to succeed in court or whether he does not; this is common knowledge between the parties. Given a small cost of …ling suit, worthy victims therefore litigate only with probability q. By contrast with perfect enforcement, esteem concerns will now be shown to matter. What information becomes public therefore also matter. For instance, even though litigation costs are negligible, injurers would favor con…dential settlements -possibly allowing victims to extract 'hush money'-if disesteem can thereby be avoided. 13 For simplicity, we consider a litigation subgame where ex post public information 13 Con…dential settlements by producers, to avoid sequential suits when there are many potential plainti¤s or to exploit consumer ignorance about the safety of a product, have been analyzed by Reinganum (1999, 2002) .
e¤ectively reduces to a binary outcome, as in the previous section. First, the …ling of a lawsuit is public information and of course so would be the outcome at trial. Secondly, secret settlements are not feasible: if payment has been extracted from an injurer, information is always leaked and it becomes publicly known that an agreement was reached. Finally, an injurer's involvement in causing harm is not publicly observable independently of lawsuits.
In this simple framework, victims with a non viable case do nothing. Victims with a viable case …le suit and pursue the case up to trial; equivalently, they settle for the amount of damages they would have obtained in court.
In either case, the reputational e¤ect on the injurer is the same. An out-ofcourt settlement imposes the same reputational penalty because settlements are public information and the injurer would not have o¤ered payment if the victim had no evidence; since the reputational penalty is the same, the injurer will not pay more than the damages he would have paid if the case had gone to trial (and the victim would not accept less). Conversely, if the victim does not have a viable case, …ling suit is not worth the small …ling cost.
Strict liability. Because victims …le suit only with probability q, the probability of legal damages (and the probability of bad news) is ' S (p) = pq, where the subscript stands for strict liability. The event G is "injurer was not sued, hence did not cause harm or caused harm but there was no evidence to prove it". The expected utility of a type-injurer's is
When he is not sued, the injurer su¤ers moral disutility from causing uncompensated harm. The best response function is
An injurer's precautions depend on his type whenever the probability of enforcement is less than unity. The analysis is similar to that of no-liability.
Being sued (and settling or being held liable if the case goes to trial) now imposes a reputational penalty. The equilibrium penalty solves an equation such as (13) with p S ( ) substituted for p 0 ( ).
A natural comparison is with no-liability for the same probability of publicity about involvement in causing harm. From (12), a type-injurer's incentives to exert care under no-liability are given by L + k 0 , where 0 is the equilibrium reputational penalty under no-liability. From (15), the injurer's incentives under strict liability are (q + (1 q))L + q S , where S is the equilibrium reputational penalty under strict liability. When k = q, moral incentives are lower under strict liability because injurers will sometimes be forced to pay damages, but this is more than compensated by the expected legal damages. However, reputational incentives are likely to be weaker. 14 Legal liability has a greater e¤ect on the incentives of injurers with low moral concerns (a small ) than on those with strong moral concerns. If precautions become more alike between types, the bad news-good news signal will be less informative about moral type. Overall, incentives to exert care are nevertheless greater under the strict liability regime.
Proposition 3 When strict liability is imperfectly enforced, injurers known
to have caused harm su¤er disesteem, both moral and esteem concerns mitigate carelessness, and greater care is exerted than under no-liability with the same (or a smaller) probability of observing involvement in causing harm.
As under perfect enforcement, formal sanctions lead to some crowding out of informal motivations but there is no net crowding out with respect to overall incentive. Again it would not matter if the occurrence of harm is observed independently of lawsuits. Note that a move from no-liability to a strict liability regime with negligible litigation costs may well increase publicity, i.e., q > k. Victims now have monetary incentives to reveal the occurrence of harm by …ling suit.
Negligence rule. The probability of being sued and found negligent is ' N (p) = 0 if p p and ' N (p) = pq otherwise, where the subscript refers to the negligence rule. Event G is "injurer did not cause harm, or caused harm but complied with due care, or did not comply but the victim could not prove it". The expected utility of a type-injurer is
There will now be situations where all injurers exert e¢ cient care even though enforcement is imperfect. This is not surprising considering that in the standard model injurers comply with due care when the probability of enforcement is above the critical q N de…ned in (3) . In the present case, however, compliance will also obtain even with enforcement below q N . We …rst characterize the pattern of compliance.
Lemma 3 If a type
0 injurer complies with due care, so does a type 00 > 0 .
Thus, either everyone complies, no one does or high moral types do and low ones do not. Next we derive a critical value for the probability of enforcement. Consider an injurer without moral concerns, i.e., = 0. Let q 1 be the solution to
The right-hand side is the expected utility of the non-complying no-moralconcern type who anticipates b G = if he is not found negligent and b B = 0 if he is. When the probability of enforcement is q 1 , this individual is just indi¤erent between complying and not. Observe that q 1 < q N .
Proposition 4
Under the negligence rule enforced with probability q, all injurers exert more care than under no-liability with the same (or a smaller) probability of publicity.
(i) WhenN , the equilibrium is the same as under the perfectly enforced negligence rule and normative motivations play no role.
(ii) When q 1 q < q N , all injurers comply with due care. Moral concerns play no role, but esteem concerns provide incentives to comply.
(iii) There exists q 0 < q 1 such that, when q 0 q < q 1 , higher moral types comply with due care, lower ones do not. Moral and esteem concerns in ‡uence the decision to comply and, for non-compliers, they mitigate carelessness.
(iv) When q < q 0 , no one complies and the outcome is the same as under strict liability with the same probability of enforcement. Figure 2 provides an illustration. The curves p N and p S depict the average probability of harm under the negligence and strict liability regimes as a function of the probability of enforcement. The curve p 0 is the average probability of accident under no-liability as a function of the probability of publicity. Figure 3 illustrates the expected utility of type = 0 in a full compliance equilibrium with q > q 1 . The utility from complying with due care is U c . The expected utility from not complying is U nc (q); if he were not to comply, the best this injurer could do is to choose the precaution level denoted by p nc (q).
The utility from not complying is drawn given the out-of-equilibrium belief b B = 0, so that the reputational penalty from being found negligent is = (a smaller reputational penalty would obviously also induce compliance).
The utility di¤erence between complying and not complying is then
By not complying the injurer would save on precaution costs, but this is more than compensated by the risk of legal damages and of disesteem. When q is reduced, U c does not change but U nc increases. At q = q 1 both are equal.
When enforcement is smaller than q 1 , both moral and reputational incentives play a role. When0 , the more morally concerned types -those with above a threshold that depends on q -comply with due care. Intuitively, it is 'less costly' to comply for more morally concerned individuals.
Less morally concerned injurers do not comply, but their carelessness is mitigated by both moral and esteem concerns as under an imperfectly enforced strict liability regime.
The intuition for the result is that a ruling of negligence provides sharper information about the injurer's behavior than the mere occurrence of harm.
Compared to strict liability or no-liability, the negligence regime may 'crowd in'normative motivations through the greater role of esteem concerns. When the probability of enforcement is not too low, a small departure from due care generates the risk of a large reputational penalty. As a result, injurers or at least some of them will choose to 'conform', i.e., to pool on the due care precaution level.
The outcome would remain the same qualitatively if involvement in causing harm were public information independently of lawsuits. The event G would then be partitioned into two events, say G 1 and G 2 , where G 1 means "did not cause harm"and G 2 means "caused harm but was not sued". When the tort rule is su¢ ciently well enforced for all injurers to comply, the equilibrium beliefs are
When not all injurers comply, it is straightforward to see that b G 1 > , but whether G 2 would be good or bad news depends on the probability of enforcement.
Discussion
The di¤erent legal regimes (no-liability, strict liability and the negligence rule) were compared in terms of how close the injurers' precautions were to the e¢ cient precaution level of the standard model. When injurers have moral and esteem concerns, however, it is not clear that p is still the appropriate target. We now compare the di¤erent regimes in an explicit utilitarian framework.
We also discuss a related but more intricate issue. In our analysis, the moral prescription was exogenously given. We then examined how legal incentives interact with normative concerns to deter careless behavior. We did not consider the degree to which the 'legal norm'was consistent with or di¤ered from the moral norm, nor the possibility that the 'legal norm'could in ‡uence the individuals'moral preferences.
Comparison of regimes. The costs of enforcing formal sanctions would naturally bear on the comparison of legal regimes. Nevertheless, we will continue to abstract from such costs.
Suppose that injurers can also be victims; that is, they can themselves su¤er harm caused by other agents. For instance, the risk generating activity under consideration is an activity such as driving which everyone engages in. 15 Let U j ( ) be the equilibrium expected utility of a type-injurer as de…ned in the previous sections, where j denotes the legal regime. When individuals are potentially both injurer and victim, the pecuniary part of one's utility is modi…ed to take into account the expected loss that the individual faces due to the actions of others. Under no-liability, the expected wealth of the type-individual is then b c(b p 0 ( )) p 0 L. Under the strict liability and negligence regimes, it is
The last term is the expected loss as victim net of the legal damages that may eventually be awarded.
Total welfare is
Under no-liability, this is easily seen to yield
where c 0 is the average precaution cost. The expression inside the …rst parentheses is the average net wealth. The middle term is the average moral disutility from causing uncompensated harm. The last term is the average utility from social esteem; reputational bene…ts and penalties cancel out (see Bén-abou and Tirole, 2006). Similarly, under the strict liability and negligence regimes, total welfare is
Consider the perfectly enforced strict liability regime. All individuals then take e¢ cient care and full compensatory damages are always paid. Hence
Clearly, welfare cannot be greater than W : wealth is maximized and there is no moral disutility from having caused harm. The perfectly enforced negligence rule also maximizes wealth. However, total welfare is now
Under strict liability, individuals bear accidental harm as injurers but not as victims. Under the negligence rule, it is the opposite since no one is found negligent. Under this rule, however, individuals as injurers su¤er moral disutility from in ‡icting uncompensated harm.
Corollary 1 When liability rules are perfectly enforced, W 0 < W N < W S .
Strict liability yields greater welfare than the negligence rule because it forces injurers to compensate their victims, thereby eliminating the moral disutility from causing harm. It is as if strict liability forced injurers to purchase a clear conscience, something they would not do spontaneously (given assumption 1). In turn, welfare is greater under negligence than under no-liability because average wealth is larger and because the moral cost of imposing uncompensated harm is smaller; both results follow from the fact that b p 0 ( ) > p for all types. When enforcement is imperfect, the welfare comparison is not as straightforward. For instance, it is not clear how negligence compares with strict liability with the same probability of enforcement. Suppose1 as de…ned in proposition 4. Under negligence, all individuals then exercise e¢ cient care.
Wealth is therefore greater under negligence than under strict liability. On the other hand, the average moral disutility could be smaller under strict liability.
Legal versus moral norms. In the above analysis, legal liability reduced to a pure system of penalties contingent on some evidence. We now inquire about the values underlying legal liability.
The moral prescription we postulated was that harming others should be avoided and that one should compensate for the harm that one does cause. Compliance with the prescription would arise spontaneously if all individuals were su¢ ciently 'morally concerned', say with 1. In a less than ideal world, such individuals rarely exist. However, strict legal liability can in principle (when enforcement is perfect) induce individuals to behave in perfect conformity with the moral prescription. Thus, one could say that strict liability 'expresses'perfectly the underlying moral norm. This is not so with the negligence rule we considered. Under this rule, the connotation is that there is no 'legal wrongdoing'when harm occurs and the injurer's actions complied with the legal due care standard. In our analysis, moral values were taken to be una¤ected by the legal norm; that is, the individuals'conception of 'moral wrongdoing'remained based solely on the prescription that one should not cause uncompensated harm. As a result, morally concerned individuals su¤er disutility from causing harm even if they are not legally 'culpable'. For instance, a driver may feel bad from hitting a pedestrian even though he is not found negligent.
It has been argued that legal rules have normative power in that they a¤ect behavior not only by shaping the material payo¤s but also by directly in ‡uencing motives. If law expresses values, it could change the individuals' perception of the moral prescription. 16 In the present context, one possibility is that the legal norm of due care modi…es the interpretation of wrongdoing.
Individuals who comply with the legal rule of conduct experience no moral 16 On the expressive theory of law, see Kahan (1997) and Cooter (1998 disutility from causing harm. Because of the legal norm de…ned by due care, the individual's utility in (4) is now
where (p) = 0 if p p and (p) = 1 otherwise. Welfare under the negligence rule is If the probability of enforcement satis…es1 as de…ned in proposition 4,
W S with strict inequality when q < 1.
Everything else equal, compared to the situation where moral preferences are una¤ected by the legal norm, complying with due care is as desirable when > 0 and it remains the same when = 0. Hence, the threshold q 1 for overall compliance remains unchanged. Welfare under the negligence rule is now greater because moral concerns are in line with the legal norm of conduct. Because the negligence rule has the potential to implement e¢ cient care even when enforcement is imperfect, it can now dominate strict liability.
Causation requirement under the negligence rule. Grady (1983) remarked that the standard accident model disregards causation requirements for a ruling of negligence. The issue of causation yields interesting insights in our analysis. As a matter of doctrine, in both common law and civil law systems, injurers are liable for damages if they did not comply with due care and if their negligence can be shown to have 'caused'the accident, i.e., the accident would not have occurred had they not been negligent. To deal with causation requirements, a more elaborate description of the stochastic environment is needed. 17 We consider the simple model proposed by Kahan (1989) . 18 In this model, when an accident occurred and the injurer was negligent (i.e., p > p ), the probability that negligence will be found to be the cause of the accident is equal to (p p )=p. Given a probability of enforcement q, the expected pecuniary payo¤ as a function of the precaution level is then
By contrast with the 'full liability'formulation discussed until now, there is no discontinuity in the expected payo¤ function in the neighborhood of due care. It follows that, in the standard model without normative motivations, an imperfectly enforced negligence rule yields the same outcome as strict liability with the same probability of enforcement.
We now introduce normative motivations into this model. Suppose the injurer feels no guilt when he complied with due care or when he did not comply but his negligence was not the cause of harm (i.e., = 0 in the notation of the previous section). The expected utility is then
The di¤erence in expected utility between complying and barely complying is now equal to
There is a now a discontinuity in the expected payo¤, but it is due solely to the reputational penalty imposed by a ruling of negligence. It is easily seen that the results of proposition 4 would remain qualitatively the same, except that we now have q N = 1 and that q 0 and q 1 would be larger. When 17 Shavell (1985) makes the point that causation is often highly uncertain and that courts often …nd the injurer liable if one cannot rule out that the accident was due to the injurer's negligence. The usual 'full liability'model is then an appropriate description. 18 See also Schweizer (2009).
enforcement is above q 1 , there is bunching on the legal due care standard only because of image concerns.
Concluding remarks
This paper incorporates normative motivations into the economic model of tort rules. We showed that informal motivations and legal sanctions complement one another when each on their own would yield suboptimal precautions. If the substantive laws are well designed but imperfectly enforced, a consideration for the moral duty not to cause uncompensated harm and/or the attempt to signal such concerns improve e¢ ciency. Conversely, if compliance with the moral duty is imperfect, appropriate liability rules improve e¢ ciency even if the law is imperfectly enforced. There is no net crowdingout of overall incentives following the introduction of formal sanctions. In particular, when enforcement is imperfect, the negligence rule has the potential to do better than strict liability because image concerns have more bite when potential injurers face the threat being found negligent.
In the unilateral accident model, potential victims are passive and can do nothing to avoid harm. Who 'caused'harm is then straightforward, although the issue of 'causation'may still arise with respect to legal liability or moral responsibility, as discussed above. How would our analysis extend to the so-called bilateral model, where both injurers and victims can take precautions? Whether the injurer caused harm or should feel responsible may then be problematic. If the victim acted foolishly, will the injurer feel bad if an accident occurs? Our results can be extended to the bilateral case through the concept of causation, in the manner discussed in the previous section but now taking into account the behavior of both injurer and victim, and/or through the function describing when moral responsibility is triggered. To illustrate, consider the simple negligence rule (as opposed, say, to contributive negligence) and suppose that the injurer feels no guilt when he has complied with due care but would feel guilty otherwise. Then we would get the same results concerning the role of informal incentives under an imperfectly en-forced negligence rule. The same holds mutatis mutandis if a non-complying injurer feels guilt only when the victim did not act ine¢ ciently.
One limitation of our analysis is that social interactions arise only through reputational e¤ects, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . These e¤ects are endogenous, i.e., they depend on what can be inferred from various occurrences.
However, it may well be that 'intrinsic motivation'also depends on one's perception of the extent to which others adhere to the moral norm, a form of Existence follows from the continuity of ( ). Moreover, there must be one solution (e.g., the one with the smallest ) at which the ( ) curve cuts the forty-…ve degree line from above, implying 0 ( ) < 1. QED Proof of proposition 1. The …rst claim follows directly from lemma 2. We show that b p( ) = P ( L + k ) > p for all . By lemma 2, < h . Because P is a decreasing function, P ( L + k ) P ( h L + h ) > P (L) = p , where the last inequality follows from assumption 1. Next we show that the probability of harm is decreasing in q. Substitute for the best responses P ( L + k ) in (13) and write as ( ; k). Let x k and de…ne
where P (x) is the average best response over all types. Condition (13) can then be rewritten as x = kg(x; k). Di¤erentiating totally with respect to k yields dx dk = g(x; k) + kg k (x; k) 1 kg x (x; k) :
The numerator is positive because g(x; k) > 0 and the function is increasing in k. The denominator is positive at a stable equilibrium because kg x (x; k) = @ ( ; k) @ < 1:
Hence, x(k) k (k) is increasing in k, implying that all injurers exert more care when k increases. QED Proof of proposition 3. We prove only the last claim. Let 0 and S be the equilibrium reputational penalties under no-liability and strict liability respectively. Incentives are greater under strict liability if
When q k,
The last inequality follows from assumption 1, the second-to-last from h and the fact that 0 , S 2 (0; h ). QED.
Proof of lemma 3. Let = b G b B > 0. Write the expected utility in (16) as U (p; ) and let
This is the utility reached by a type-injurer who complies with due care. Let
This is the most an injurer can obtain when he does not comply. Then 
where the right-hand side is the utility of complying when good news yields . Type = 0 complies if b B e B (q). From (3), e B (q) = when q = q N ; from (17) , e B (q) = 0 when q = q 1 . Moreover, e B (q) is increasing and continuous.
Thus, when q 2 [q 1 ; q N ), there is an upper bound e B (q) < such that beliefs satisfying b B e B (q) induce compliance when = 0; by lemma 3, such beliefs induce overall compliance.
When q < q 1 , equation (24) has no solution. In equilibrium some injurers will therefore not comply and both B and G will have positive probability, implying 2 (0; h ). If some injurers comply, lemma 3 implies the existence of a type threshold (q) < h above which injurers comply. For q su¢ ciently close to q 1 , such a threshold necessarily exists. For q su¢ ciently small, however, it does not. To see this, de…ne
This is the expected utility of the high type = h when he is found liable with probability q with bad news yielding b B = 0 and good news yielding b G = h , i.e., the anticipated reputational penalty is = h . The function is strictly decreasing in q. Let q c be the solution to
The right-hand side is the expected utility of the same injurer if he complies.
It is easily veri…ed that (25) has a solution satisfying 0 < q c < q 1 . Because at equilibrium we must have < h , even the high type = h would not comply whenc . Thus, there exists some q 0 2 (q c ; q 1 ) as stated in (iii) and (iv). QED
